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Improper Use of the Trial Judge as VoucherThe IssueUnited States v. Harlow, 444 F.3d 1255 (10  Cir. 2006), analyzes whether athprosecutor acts improperly when he uses the trial judge to vouch for the credibilityof prosecution witnesses.  The court finds that the prosecutor’s invitation to thejury to rely on the actions of the judge amounted to improper vouching, althoughthe impropriety was not serious enough to warrant overturning the defendant’sconviction.The FactsHarlow was the last of several defendants to be tried for participation in amethamphetamine distribution conspiracy in Gillette, Wyoming.  The governmentrelied upon six witnesses to prove its case, five of whom were coconspirators whohad entered guilty pleas and reached agreements with the government.  Threewitnesses had already received sentence reductions for their testimony in priorcases.  With respect to these three, the prosecutor introduced their pleaagreements, which referred to the requirements of cooperation and truthfulness,the government’s Rule 35 (b) motions recommending sentence reductions basedon their prior testimony, and the orders granting the reductions which were signedby the same trial judge presiding over Harlow’s trial.  With respect to the othertwo witnesses who had not yet received sentence reductions, the prosecutorquestioned them about the contents of their plea agreements and the possibility oftheir obtaining sentence reductions.The Defense AttackFrom the opening statements to the closing arguments, the defense attack onthe government was consistent.  Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor wasrelying on “snitch testimony, testimony that is essentially . . . purchased by thegovernment in the form of time . . . less prison time.”  Defense counselcharacterized the witnesses’ testimony as “unreliable” and suggested that eachwitness “knows the score,” meaning that he “knows what he needs to do here inWyoming to help himself out.”  Id. at 1259.  Each witness, defense counselargued, knows “he only has to put a slight twist on his testimony to get the benefithere.” This is not the place to evaluate the quality of the defense argument, but itought to be pointed out that when five witnesses who have pleaded guilty to thecriminal conduct also charged against Harlow all testify to Harlow’s involvement,it doesn’t look like “a slight twist.”  If their testimony is all false, it looks like amajor, concerted effort to frame Harlow; there would be nothing slight about it. The Prosecutor’s Response
 Whether or not the jury found the argument to be odd is unknowable, but we doknow that the prosecutor chose to respond to the defense attack in the rebuttalclosing argument:You know, the government always - it just doesn't matter. Any casewhere you call coconspirators to testify against the othercoconspirators, we've suddenly hopped in bed with the defendants,the coconspirators, and we've hopped in bed with drug dealers.  It'sthe law, ladies and gentlemen. Congress has a part in that process.  [Itpasses] laws that allow the government to give breaks to cooperatingcoconspirator drug dealers. Separation of powers.  It's all here.Congress allows it to happen. The executive branch, representing theexecutive, we're involved.  We use them as witnesses.  But what'sreally important, and you can have a chance to take a look at this,you've got the orders reducing their sentences signed by thejudicial branch, Judge Johnson.  (Id. (emphasis added).)The trial judge, Judge Alan B. Johnson, instructed the jury that it must examine thetestimony of an alleged accomplice or coconspirator “with greater care than thetestimony of a witness who did not participate in the commission of a crime,” andit must “determine whether the testimony of an accomplice or coconspirator hasbeen affected by self-interest or by any agreement he may have with the UnitedStates.”  Id. at 1259-60.Defense Counsel’s ComplaintImmediately after the court instructed the jury, defense counsel approachedthe bench and requested either a mistrial or a curative instruction.  He argued thatthe government’s rebuttal argument “suggested that because [the trial court’s]signature was on these [sentence reduction orders] that somehow the [trial judge]was vouching for the credibility of these witnesses.”  Id. at 1260. The Trial Judge’s Curative InstructionThe trial judge denied the request for a mistrial but agreed to give a curativeinstruction.  He instructed the jury as follows:There was reference made to me having signed an order approving aplea agreement by and between the parties. I'd explain to you that Ireview plea agreements and decide whether or not they violate anypublic policy as part of the duties that the judge has in every case. Idon't vouch for the credibility of any of the witnesses who haveappeared here before this court. That is your job. That is not my job.And I don't make that decision in a case. You're the ones who see thewitnesses testify, consider their testimony and, under the instructionsof the Court, are the judges of the facts and the weight and credibility
of the witnesses.  (Id.)The Trial ResultThe jury deliberated for only three hours before it returned a guilty verdict. The trial judge later sentenced Harlow to 120 months imprisonment, and Harlowfiled a notice of appeal through new counsel.  One of his principal arguments wasthat the prosecutor had improperly used the reference to the trial judge to vouchfor witnesses.  The Argument on AppealHarlow’s argument on appeal was “that vouching occurred when the jurywas given the provisions of the plea agreement in conjunction with the evidencethat the prosecutor moved for benefits thereunder and the judge issued hisapproval.”  Id. at 1262.  According to Harlow, “the jury could very reasonablyinfer that not only had these witnesses promised to tell the truth, but the prosecutorand the judge had verified their testimony via the motion and order – testimonyconsistent with their testimony at this trial.”  Id.  So, Harlow had two separatearguments.  The first, that the jury might have inferred that the prosecutor hadverified the testimony, is not discussed here.  It is the subject of the next article. The focus here is on the prosecutor’s reference to Judge Johnson.The court of appeals agreed with Harlow that the prosecutor made animproper argument:Aside from his inelegant discussion of our tripartite system ofgovernment, the prosecutor stated Judge Johnson had signed off onthe testimony of Janway, Flint and Villa. In our view, this violates theprohibition against vouching. While the prosecutor probably meantthe jurors should look at the sentence reduction orders as evidencethat the judicial branch approves of sentence reductions and co-conspirator testimony in general, his statements to the jury were notso precise. Rather, he directed the jury to look at the sentencereduction orders and attach special importance to them. This is tooeasily construed as a statement that "the judicial branch, JudgeJohnson" had personally approved the credibility of the witnesses'testimony by signing off on their sentence reduction orders.  (Id. at1266.)The court stated that the government tried to defend the rebuttal argumentby contending that defense counsel impermissibly attacked the prosecutor’scharacter and veracity, but the court found that this argument did not fit the factsbecause defense counsel attacked the prosecution’s witnesses rather than theprosecutor.  Apparently, the court might have been sympathetic to the rebuttalargument if defense counsel had suggested that the prosecutor had somehow acted
to create false testimony.  The probable reasoning is that, when a prosecutor isattacked for offering sentence reductions, the fact of judicial approval may be afair response to the attack.The court went beyond simply finding improper vouching.  It reiterated anadmonition to prosecutors that it had previously offered in United States v.Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2000):In Broomfield, we took the "opportunity to advise prosecutors againstwhat we perceive to be an increasing willingness to unnecessarilypush the envelope of improper vouching." 201 F.3d at 1276. Werepeat that admonition here.  (Id.)The court found that the vouching was not sufficiently prejudicial to require a newtrial, since the curative instruction given by the trial judge shortly after theimproper argument “sufficiently disabused the jury of any misimpression createdby the prosecutor’s inartful closing argument.”  (Id.)The LessonProsecutors have to walk a fine line in dealing with sentence reductionagreements.  They offer them on direct examination to bring out the bargain that awitness has received for cooperating with the government, but the fact that Rule35 (b) sentence reduction agreements are approved by the court is no reason forprosecutors to emphasize that fact.  Prosecutors will be well advised to simplypoint out the extent of the benefit that the witness has received.  Surprisingly prosecutors might also want to ask for the “curative”instruction given by Judge Johnson in this case in all cases.  The reason is that in afuture case a defendant might argue that jurors, unschooled in the mechanics ofRule 35, might assume that it involves some judicial screening of the truthfulnessof prior testimony.  This might be especially troubling when the trial judge in onecase approved the sentence reductions of the testifying witnesses, as was true inHarlow.  By asking for an instruction explaining that the judge does not vouch forcredibility when approving a sentence reduction, a prosecutor can avoid any claimthat the sentence reduction agreements might have been misunderstood by jurorsas judicial vouching.



